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A curious case of bank fraud

by James J. White
On April 16, 1980, a man using the
name Marvin Goldstein opened a bank
account at a Baltimore branch of Union Trust
Company. He deposited $15,000 in cash. He
told the branch manager that he planned to
establish a Baltimore office of his father's New
York business, "Goldstein's Precious Metals
and Stones." Goldstein identified himself with
a New Jersy driver's license and gave a bank
reference from New York. On May 6,
Goldstein deposited a check for $880,000 at
another Union Trust branch near the branch
where he had opened the account. Words on
this check indicated that it was drawn on the
account of Metropolitan Investment
Corporation at First Pennsylvania

Bank, a large Philadelphia bank. Unbeknownst to the Union Trust officers, the fractional numerals in the upper right hand corner of the check identified Albany State
Bank as the payor, and the numerals at the bottom of the check were gibberish: they
identified no bank at all. Apparently Goldstein had altered the numerals at the bottom
for they were not magnetic numerals, were of the wrong size and were nonsensical. On
most checks the name of the drawee, the fraction in the upper right hand corner and
the Magnetic Ink Character Recognition ("MICR") - encoded numerals on the bottom - all identify a payor.
Because the numerals on the bottom were not magnetically encoded, the Union Trust
machine could not read them and the check had to be sent for collection manually. Accordingly, Union Trust transferred it by courier to Philadelphia National Bank (PNB).
In apparent reliance on the numerical indication in the fraction, PNB sent it to the New
York Federal Reserve processing center in Utica, New York on May 7; Albany State received the check on the morning of May 9. On May 10, Albany returned it to the Utica
center stamped "Sent in Error," and on May 13 it was returned to the New York Federal Reserve Bank's New York City office. The New York Federal Reserve Bank then
sent it on May 14 to the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia for collection at First
Pennsylvania. It was presented on May 14 at 9 a.m. at First Pennsylvania; First Pennsylvania notified PNB of dishonor at 9:45 on the morning of May 16. PNB sent word of
dishonor to Union Trust in the middle of the afternoon on May 16.
Unfortunately, Goldstein had come to Union Trust on May 15 to withdraw $95,000
in cash and to direct a wire transfer of $660,000 to the account of a Maryland coin
dealer. On May 16, Goldstein picked up his coins and disappeared. No one has heard
from him since.

THE CURSE

Goldstein's curse is the inability
of the banking system to distinguish between legitimate payment orders and fraudulent ones.

Goldstein's curse is the inability of the banking system to distinguish between legitimate payment orders and fraudulent ones. When checks were not widely used, and
when bank employees knew each depositor and recognized each signature, it would
have been impossible for Goldstein to have escaped with $800,000.
To understand why the curse rests upon our system and why we will not be able to
exorcise it, consider the qualities that are necessary for its existence. First is a high
volume of transactions. The American system handled more than forty-seven billion
checks in 1987, and the two principal wire payment systems, Fedwire and Clearinghouse Interbank Payments System ("CHIPS"), transfer about one trillion dollars per
day. If each of those transactions had been handled by one with a comprehensive
knowledge of the practical and legal consequences of each act, the system could not
have worked. The volume of transactions demands that a larger and larger share of the
work be done mechanically and electronically and that the human labor come in a form
that is highly specialized and semi-skilled.
Because most of the work must be done electronically or mechanically, there must
be a way to distinguish mechanically or electronically between one account and another, one bank and another, and one transaction and another. Whatever their
intelligence in the hands of a clever programmer, computers - even those that can
handle a large volume of transactions - are notoriously rigid and highly restricted in
their adaptability to new information.
A second quality of our funds transfer system that feeds the curse is its complexity.
Few of the people associated with the funds transfer system fully understand its operation. A person who MICR encodes the dollar amounts on the check in the basement of
the depositary bank may be highly efficient at doing that but is unlikely to be able to
distinguish a drawer's from an indorser's signature or to understand the legal consequences of either. The person who operates the photographic and sorting machine at
the payor bank may have a detailed knowledge about how the machine can become
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The bank officer should have
been put on notice when Goldstein appeared at the bank with
an expensive bottle of champagne to speed the bank's
approval of his withdrawal
of the funds.

jammed or the camera can breakdown, but is unlikely to understand that her bank will
be liable if it holds a check beyond the midnight deadline. Those at the receiving bank
who routinely enter electronic funds transfers into various accounts identified by number are blissfully ignorant of the fact that even though the number on the electronic
fund message and on the account may be identical, the names on the two may be different. The complexity, the volume, and the necessary compartmentalization of the
human activity in the system all feed Goldstein's curse.
Nor is the system likely to change in ways that will allow us to be rid of it. Consider
three events that have occurred within the last twenty years that have magnified the impact of the curse. First is MICR encoding. Almost all preprinted checks have MICR
encoding to identify the payor bank, the drawer's account, the location of the payor and
the type of instrument. At the depositary bank, the payment amount is manually MICR
encoded at the bottom of the check. The check is then fed into a machine that automatically sorts it, reads the dollar amount, credits the proper account, debits another, and
sends the check toward its apparent payor. Thereafter, the check may never again be
manually handled. This MICR encoding is now universal and means that there is usually no human intervention in the transfer of funds after the check goes through the
first step in the process at the depositary bank.
A second recent change is the imposition of dollar cutoffs below which banks do not
examine drawers' signatures. Although banks do not advertise this behavior, few banks
now check all signatures. Failure to check signatures is a direct response to the volume
and to the need for speed, but that omission, of course, removes all possibility with respect to such checks that a forgery will be discovered by comparing the signature on
the check with the true signature of the depositor.
A third event is check truncation. Truncation is the destruction of the check before it
reaches the payor bank. Currently truncation is practiced by many credit unions which
hire banks to collect their checks and which allow the banks to destroy the checks and
send the information to the credit union electronically. Almost certainly truncation will
spread to banks generally and then turn upstream to occur at the depositary bank. In
the twenty-first century, checks will be photographed and then destroyed at the depositary bank and all of the information will be transmitted only electronically.
Each of these three events speeds the transaction, but each diminishes the possibility
that a human being will intervene to distinguish between a legitimate and a fraudulent
transfer. Projecting this experience into the future, we can predict that the damage
wreaked by Goldstein's curse will grow, not diminish, and that those in charge of the
payment system will have difficulty merely to maintain the system's current ability to
distinguish legitimate from fraudulent transactions.

FOUR EXAMPLES
Before I examine the legal doctrines that allocate the losses arising from Goldstein's
curse, I will finish Goldstein's story and describe three other common frauds to give an
appreciation of the scope and nature of the problem.
The civil debris left by Goldstein's crime fell at the feet of Judge Haight in the
Southern District of New York. In United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Federal
Reserve Bank of New York ("Union Trust"), Union Trust argued that the various collecting banks downstream from it, namely PNB, Albany State, and the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York were agents and were liable to it under section 4-202 for negligent
handling of the $880,000 Goldstein check. They also argued that First Pennsylvania
had liability for holding the check beyond its midnight deadline. Judge Haight rejected
all of those arguments and left the loss on Union Trust.
The Judge rejected the invitation to apply a comparative negligence standard.
Rather, he applied section 3-406 by analogy to the behavior of Union Trust. Union
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Trust had done a variety of acts with respect to Goldstein and the Goldstein check
which showed it to be a "substantial contributor to the loss." In the first place, the
teller failed to put a hold on the $880 ,000 check of the kind that the bank procedures
normally required. In the second place, the Bank's own check processing machine spit
out the check because the letters at the bottom were not magnetically encoded. Despite
its obvious deficiencies (the numerals were not only not MICR encoded, but they were
the wrong size and shape), the check was sent on for manual collection. Union Trust
failed to record Goldstein's alleged banking association in New York and so was unable
to check on it. Had it inquired with the New York banking reference, there Union Trust
would have found no knowledge of Goldstein. When it did check with credit bureaus and
with First Pennsylvania, it was told there was no account in the name of the drawer on
the $880,000 check and that the credit bureaus had no knowledge of Goldstein. Finally,
the bank officer should have been put on notice when Goldstein appeared at the bank
with an expensive bottle of champagne to speed the bank's approval of his withdrawal
of the funds.
The assistant branch manager who ultimately authorized the wire transfer, on May
15, apparently believed that the check had been paid because the Union Trust computer
treated the funds as "collected." Evidently that employee did not realize that the fact
that an item is shown as "collected" in the computer memory does not mean that final
payment has occurred, but is merely a reflection of an assumption that is itself built
into the computer program about the expected time it should take for the final payment
of a check. For all of these reasons, Union Trust was properly regarded as far more
negligent than any other party in the transaction; surely it was the least cost-risk
avoider in this case and should have borne the loss.
That was exactly the outcome that Judge Haight required. He did so by applying
3-406 by analogy to the behavior of Union Trust. He commented,. as follows:
The depositary bank, like the drawer of the check, is well situated to protect the system against MICR
fraud. The depositary bank has an opportunity to examine the check free of time pressures which prevent
collecting banks from giving checks more than a cursory glance. Perhaps more important, the depositary
bank is in the unique position of being able to examine both the depositor and the check. No other bank
in the collecting chain can examine the depositor, a crucial advantage given the seeming difficulty of
detecting this type of fraud.

The Judge pointed out that there may be cases of MICR fraud in which the depositary
bank should not bear the loss but where the collecting bank should be liable under section 4-202.
My second example deals with a most ancient and common form of check theft forging the drawer's signature. This case shows the impact of the curse even on conventional frauds. In Medford Irrigation District v. Western Bank, a bookkeeper forged
the name of her employer on a number of checks which were cashed at the defendant
bank. For the purpose of summary judgment, the plaintiff conceded its negligence in
not supervising the bookkeeper, not auditing the accounts, and in failing to review the
bank statements. It also conceded that its negligence substantially contributed to the
forgeries. Nevertheless, plaintiff argued that the bank did not follow "reasonable commercial banking standards" or exercise "ordinary care" because it failed to examine
signatures on checks for amounts of less than $5,000.
The appellate court affirmed the summary judgment for the plaintiff. Because it
found the bank to be negligent, it ruled that the depositor's negligence in supervising
the embezzler was irrelevant.
Rhode Island Hospital Trust National Bank v. 'Zapata Corp. is indistinguishable from
Medford Irrigation, but the First Circuit comes to the opposite conclusion. There, an
embezzler stole a number of blank checks from Zapata, forged its signature and entered
amounts between $150 and $800 on each check. Between March and July 1985, the
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payor paid $109,247.16 of these forged checks. Relying on section 4-406, the court of
appeals affirmed a judgment for the bank as to the checks presented for payment more
than two weeks after Zapata had received the first bank statement reflecting the forgeries. A banking expert testified that most banks do not examine drawers' signatures on
checks under a certain dollar amount; he also testified that this practice had not caused
any significant increase in forgery losses. The court concluded that such behavior was
not negligent.
In concluding that the payor's failure to examine was not negligent, the court made
explicit reference to Judge Hand's famous definition of " duty" in United States v. Carrol Towing Co . There, Judge Hand recognized that one can fail to take certain plausible
and possible precautions and yet not be negligent because of such failure if the burden
of precaution is large compared with the gravity of the harm and the probability of its
occurrence.
What is new about Rhode Island Trust and Medford Irrigation is not the acts of the
embezzlers; it is the acts of the banks. The increased volume of checks handled by every bank has caused virtually all banks to abandon the practice of examining signatures
on every check. The differing outcomes in these two cases exactly demonstrate the differing responses to Goldstein's curse.
My third case is a common theft that has been described in appellate decisions for
more than 100 years. An unfaithful corporate employee first procures a proper corporate signature on a check payable to the order of a bank. The thief then deposits the
check in his own account at that bank or receives cash on the check's presentation.
Bank employees are accustomed to treating checks payable to their bank as though they
are payable to cash, and recognize them as a means by which depositors withdraw their
own funds. Routinely, therefore, tellers and bank operations employees follow the instructions of persons in possession of such checks because they confuse this fraudulent
use of the check with"'its legitimate use. Here the thief takes advantage not of the
computer's ignorance, but of the ignorance of the bank employees.
J. Gordon Neely Enterprises Inc . v. American National Bank of Huntsville is illustrative of these cases. In that case, a Huntsville Midas Muffler shop was operated by the
Neelys. In 1976, the Neelys hired Louise Bradshaw as a Kelly Girl. Louise stayed on to
help Mrs. Neely learn how to "keep the corporate books." Among other things, Louise
suggested that the Neelys open a bank account at American National Bank and that funds
be put in that account by checks drawn on their regular account at First Alabama. The
American National account was to be used for payroll and certain other purposes~ In
1977, Louise Bradshaw made out nineteen different checks payable to the order of American National Bank for the signature of Mrs. Neely. Louise left large gaps to the left of
the amount written on the designated line, but Mrs. Neely .signed them anyway. Louise
would then add a digit or two to the left of the original amount or raise the first digit by
using liquid erasure. She then made a split deposit at American National by putting the
original amount into Neely's American National payroll account and depositing the rest
into her own account. Louise saw to it that she got possession of the checks when they
were returned to the Midas Shop and she covered up her defalcation by again using
liquid erasure on the checks to return them to the original amount and by reconciling
the accounts by herself or doing so with Mrs. Neely in a way in which Mrs. Neely
never saw the statements.
When a new accountant was hired in the latter part of 1977, he quickly discovered
embezzlements of $17 ,005.18. The Neelys sued American National for conversion.
They argued that, although the bank had been directed to make payment to itself
("pay to bank" the checks had said), instead it had paid more than $17 ,000 to Louise
Bradshaw. Relying upon the bank's expert testimony to the effect that banks normally
treat such checks as "payable to the order of cash," the court treated the checks as
bearer paper and found American National neither negligent nor guilty of conversion.

There is no explicit provision in the current versions of articles 3 or 4 that deals with
cases like Neely. The majority of the courts have disagreed with the Neely outcome
and have concluded that the bank should bear liability for its failure to follow the customer's order.
The case demonstrates that Goldstein's curse is not merely a problem of rigid and
unintelligent computers, but inheres also in the inability of human actors with limited
skill and understanding to distinguish honest from fraudulent transactions. Louise
Bradshaw - and many before her and many to come - instinctively appreciate that
the meaning which a bank teller or the bank operations person places on a check payable to the "order of the bank" is different from the meaning that a lawyer or a sophisticated banker might apply to that same instrument. To the low-level employee, that
check means "pay this amount as the bearer says." To the lawyer (and sometimes to
the courts) it means "pay this amount to the bank and, where that seems not sensible,
investigate."
My fourth and final case shows that the most modern transactions are at least as susceptible to the curse as the ancient ones are. It involves an electronic funds transfer. In
this case, the thief instructs a bank (over the forged signature of the depositor, the true
owner of the account) to make payment to its own depositor but into a numerically
identified account at another bank. The success of this fraud depends upon the sending
bank's necessary ignorance of the significance of the account number at the receiving
bank. It is aided by the fact that the sending bank regards the transfer merely as the
shifting of funds by its own depositor to an account at another bank also owned by the
same depositor. Finally, it depends upon the knowledge that the employee at the receiving bank will disregard the name on the incoming message and the name on its account
and will simply deposit funds into the account at its bank whose number corresponds
with the number on the electronic funds message. In effect, the thief understands that
the outbound message will be treated as a message identified byname and that the inbound message will be treated as a message identified by number.
In Bradford Trust Co. of Boston v. Texas American Bank - Houston, two persons
using the names of Hank and Dave Friedman sent a forged letter and a stock power
to Bradford Trust, the agent for a mutual fund. This letter directed the liquidation of
$800 ,000 from the mutual fund account of Frank Rochefort. The authors of the letter
instructed Bradford to wire the $800,000 to the account of Frank Rochefort, account
number 057141, in the Texas American Bank - Houston. Bradford instructed its bank,
State Street Bank of Boston, to wire the funds to Texas American, and it did. The employee at Texas American ignored Rochefort's name and put the $800,000 in account
number 057141. That account belonged to Colonial Coins, not to Frank Rochefort.
Prior to the receipt of the funds, the Friedmans had arranged to buy coins worth
$800,000 and had told Colonial they would soon be depositing the purchase price
in Colonial's account at Texas American. When the money appeared in its account,
Colonial released the coins and the Friedmans disappeared with them. Here we see
a variation on the curse that combines elements of the "pay to the order of the bank"
transaction and the MICR encoding fraud. The thieves anticipated that the transmitting
party would be put at ease by the fact that their own customer Rochefort was to be
the recipient of the money. Moreover, they anticipated that neither Bradford nor State
Street Bank could easily find out the true owner of the account numbered 057141 at a
Houston bank. They also anticipated that the machine operator in the basement of the
Houston bank would identify the recipient by number and number only. Because that
operator would be doing hundreds of such transactions per hour, they assumed that she
would not take the time to compare the name on account number 057141 and the name
of the intended recipient on the incoming message. Thus, the system treats the outbound message as one for Rochefort and the inbound message as one for 057141.
In Bradford Trust, the trial court applied the Texas comparative negligence statute

The increased volume of checks
handled by every bank has caused
virtually all banks to abandon
the practice of examining signatures on every check.
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and apportioned the loss equally between Bradford and Texas American Bank. Both
banks appealed; each argued that the other should bear the entire loss. The appellate
court concluded that the loss should fall on Bradford Trust Company of Boston because
it had failed to follow its own procedures, procedures that would have stopped the loss
had they been followed. Because of an earlier fraud, Bradford had a procedure requiring that requests for wire transfers of large dollar amounts be verified by a senior
supervisor at the bank. Bradford's procedure apparently also required a phone call to
Rochefort, which, of course, would have uncovered the fraud. The court also noted
that Bradford had dealt with the thieves, but Texas American had dealt only with its
own customer, Colonial Coin.
The court's reasoning about who could most easily avoid the loss, therefore who
should bear it, seems persuasive. Like Judge Haight in the Union Trust case, the court
makes a sensible and conventional judgment about who could most easily have avoided
the loss. Moreover, the court properly declined to find that the sender of the message
should always bear the loss as opposed to the recipient. Under Bradford Trust, it would
always be open to the sender in a later case to argue that the receiver of the message
was the one most at fault.

WHAT THE DRAFTERS HAVE PROPOSED
The specific problems that I have suggested above are well known to commercial
lawyers, and a fortiori to the bright commercial lawyers who are drafters of the newly
proposed article 4A and of the amendments to articles 3 and 4. It is not surprising, therefore, to find that three of the four specific problems that I have suggested are dealt with
in these amendments. First, I will discuss the specific sections in article 4A and in the
amendments to article~ 3 and 4 that will touch upon each of the four examples that I
have suggested. Then I will raise the question whether those responses are the wisest
and most sensible responses that could be made to these problems. Specifically, I will
address the question whether the drafters should behave like repairmen who replace a
shock absorber and an occasional bent A-arm or whether they should design a new
vehicle with stronger A-arms and better shock absorbers.
Recall that Judge Haight applied section 3-406 by analogy to Union Trust. Section
3-406 is usually used to estop a payee or a drawer from proving that his signature is
not his own because he "substantially contributed" to the making of the forgery. That
section did not apply to Union Trust for its signature was not forged; yet the court used
the section by analogy. I see nothing in the amendments to article 4 and in article 4A
that would directly apply to the Union Trust case. If the case were to arise again, a bank
in Union Trust's position could assert the same claims against the downstream banks
for negligence under 4-202, just as Union Trust did. If the court concluded that Union
Trust should bear the loss, it would have to go through almost the same kind of analysis that Judge Haight used in that case.
There is, however, one twist in the proposed amendments; they incorporate a rule of
comparative negligence. Proposed section 3-406 provides that the "loss is allocated
between the person precluded and the person asserting the preclusion according to the
extent to which the failure of each to exercise ordinary care contributed to the loss."
If the judge were to apply section 3-406, by analogy under that regime, presumably
he would have to determine whether the New York Federal Reserve, the Albany State
Bank, the Philadelphia National Bank, or First Pennsylvania Bank had "substantially"
contributed to the loss and, if they had, allocate a percentage of the loss to them.
Beyond that change in section 3-406, the amendments leave the judge free to reason
by analogy and give him little or no guidance.
The second example, the forged signature dispute illustrated by Rhode Island Hospi-
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tal Trust and Medford Irrigation District, is explicitly resolved by section 4-406(6) that
reads as follows:
Whether the bank failed to exercise ordinary care is determined by reasonable banking standards at the
time and place where the check was paid. Reasonable banking standards do not require a payor bank to examine an item that is processed for payment by automated means if the failure to examine did not violate
the bank's prescribed procedures and the bank's procedures do not vary unreasonably from reasonable procedures followed by comparable banks.

The proposed comment three explicitly refers to the two cases and states that it is rejecting the latter and adopting the rule of the former.
The third example involving the "pay to bank" case is apparently resolved by the addition of a new section 3-307, Notice of Breach of Fiduciary Duty. Section 3-307(d)
states that one who takes a check from a fiduciary (including an agent) has notice of a
breach of a fiduciary's duty, if, among other things, the check is "deposited to an account other than the account of the fiduciary, as such, or an account of a represented
person." Untwisted, this means that if a thief deposits the check to his personal account - as opposed to an account held "as" agent or trustee - it is not deposited to
an account of the fiduciary "as such" and the very deposit in the personal account
gives notice to the bank of the breach of duty. Because the bank is on notice of the
breach of the fiduciary duty, it cannot be a holder in due course and it is presumably
left open to the claims of the true owner of the money, namely, those of the thief's
employer.
Name and number conflicts are dealt with explicitly in section 4A-305. That section
authorizes the receiving bank to "treat the person identified by number as the beneficiary of the order, if the bank does not know that the name and number identify different
persons." Although there are some other qualifications to the rule and some uncertainties inherent in it, the rule generally puts the burden on the sender 9f an electronic
message, not on the receiver. Basically it authorizes the receiver of an electronic message to cast a blind eye on the name and to rely exclusively on the account number.
Presumably that is exactly what receiving banks will do henceforth and the burden will
fall on the sender, not on the receiving bank.
To give the drafters their due, I should point out that they have responded to certain
aspects of Goldstein's curse in other, somewhat more expansive, ways. For example,
sections 4A-202 and 4A-203 authorize a bank and its customer to establish commercially reasonable security procedures. With limited exceptions, those provisions allow
the enforcement of even fraudulent transfer orders that are made in compliance with
those security procedures. The rules embodied in sections 4A-202 and 4A-203 are as
close as the drafters come to a general recognition of the problems associated with the
curse and, in my view, the rules that are set out are the correct ones.
With the exception of sections 4A-202 and 4A-203, I think it is fair to say that the
drafters' actions are more in the nature of repairs, replacement of shock absorbers, not
in the form of redesign of the A-arms. The dispute between those who seek to minimize costs by mere repair and those who seek grand improvement at higher risk occurs
everywhere. There are, of course, good arguments on both sides of the repair or redesign argument, and I am not certain that I am right and that the drafters are wrong.

The dispute between those
who seek to minimize costs by
mere repair and those who seek
grand improvement at higher
risk occurs everywhere.

WHAT THE LAW SHOULD BE
In conclusion, I turn to an evaluation of article 4A and of the proposed amendments
to articles 3 and 4 as those proposals apply to Goldstein's curse. As one will see, I have
one significant criticism and I accuse the drafters of a few peccadilloes.
To evaluate the response of article 4A and the new amendments to Goldstein's curse,
I begin with three assumptions. If any of these is incorrect, my criticisms of article 4A
and of the amendments to articles 3 and 4 are also defective.
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My first assumption is that Learned Hand was right. I assume that society is best
served by placing losses on those who could best have avoided them. I believe that we
should not label one as negligent merely because he could avoid a loss at some price.
We should compare the cost of avoidance with the probability of occurrence and the
magnitude of the injury. I assume that placing the loss on the lowest cost-risk avoider
will cause that person to take the most appropriate steps to avoid or minimize it and
those steps would be less expensive by hypothesis than those that could or would be
taken by others. Therefore, I assume that the overall cost to society of Goldstein's curse
will be minimized by placing all or most of the losses associated with it on the one who
could least expensively prevent those losses.
Second, I assume that the curse cannot be exorcised. I assume that speed and high
volume in a payment system is antithetical to reflective intelligence. I assume that the
number and amount of payments will grow in more or less its current form, but with
paper gradually giving way to electronics. I assume, therefore, that the system's dayto-day supervision will be in the hands of persons who understand only a small part of
the process and who are largely unskilled and unsophisticated except in the operation
of their own small parts of the larger system. I assume that an increasing share of all
transfers will be without human intervention of any kind, accomplished by computers,
by MICR encoding and by the reading of electronic messages. Therefore, I assume
that the opportunity for the Goldsteins and others will grow, not shrink.
Third, I assume that the person who can most cheaply avoid the losses is nearly always someone outside the banking system or at its margins. In the embezzlement case,
I assume that the employer of the embezzler can almost always avoid the loss at lower
cost, by hiring and supervising the employee, by examining check statements, and by
maintaining sensible business practices.
Where, as in Goldstein's own case, the thief is not an embezzler, it is more difficult
to predict who can most easily avoid the loss. Surely Judge Haight's judgment is persuasive that Union Trust was the villain in Goldstein's case, but one can imagine other
cases, done by more clever thieves than Goldstein, where it might be a Federal Reserve
or a collecting bank who could most easily discover the loss. Because the bank's
pockets will often be the deepest and it the most obvious object of the court's disapproval, I fear a natural inclination of some courts to put the loss on the banking system
in the misguided notion that the banks can most easily avoid the loss and most easily
spread it among their customers.
If one accepts my three assumptions, that losses will be minimized by putting them
on the lowest cost-risk avoider, that Goldstein's curse cannot be exorcised, and the persons outside the banking system are most often the least cost-risk avoiders, one can
find significant fault with article 4A and with the proposed amendments to articles 3
and4.
First, consider three peccadilloes. As I have indicated above, section 3-307 would
appear to decree that the depositor is the winner and the bank the loser in the "pay to
bank" check case described above in Neely. One reaches this conclusion because 3-307
states that the bank is ipso facto on notice and, having notice, is not a holder in due
course. Presumably, therefore, it is open to the claims of the true owner of the check
for conversion. If the three assumptions under which I am proceeding are correct, this
section will sometimes absolutely foreclose the correct outcome. In cases like Neely, I
assume that the operator of the Midas Muffler Shop who deals with the embezzler on a
day-to-day basis, who fails to use proper business practices, and who would know of
the embezzlement with only ten seconds' examination of the bank statement, is the
least cost-risk avoider. He is the one who should bear the loss - just as the court held
in Neely. To the extent that section 3-307 invariably places the loss on the bank, I believe it is wrong.
On the other hand, I would not argue that the customer should always bear the loss
in these cases. There may be many cases in which there are only a limited number of
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checks involved and in which the procedures of the customer are adequate. In such
cases, the bank may well be the one who should bear the loss as many courts have
found in cases analogous to Neely.
The second peccadillo lies in sections 4A-204 and 4A-304. Each of these deals with
the duty of the customer or sender to report unauthorized (4A-204) or erroneously executed (4A-304) payment orders. Unlike section 4-406, where the customer bears at
least his share of the loss if he fails to examine the bank statements and make timely
reports, these sections give the customer a mere slap on the hands. They deprive the
customer of interest on the amount that was erroneously or improperly debited, yet
they permit the negligent customer to recover the principal amount. If the customer is
obliged to examine his statement that shows the payment of checks and if his failure to
report improper payments shown on such statements renders him liable for subsequent
withdrawals, I fail to understand why a similar obligation should not be imposed on the
customer where the payment is done electronically. Indeed, with check truncation where even check transfers are concluded electronically - any justification for a
distinction for a different rule in sections 4-406 and 4A-204 and 4A-304 is more
uncertain. In many such cases the customer will surely be the least cost-risk avoider
and in such cases he should report the altered check to the bank or suffer the
consequences.
My third complaint, and one that I assert with less confidence than the others, has
to do with the introduction of a comparative negligence standard in sections 3-406 and
4-406. On the one hand, these rules may facilitate the allocation of losses arising out of
the curse in ways consistent with my argument. Under the current sections 3-406 and
4-406, the bank can throw the loss back on the customer only if the bank itself is not
contributorily negligent. If the bank failed to follow reasonable commercial standards
or was contributorily negligent, it throws none of the loss on the customer; it bears it
all. Comparative negligence standards will almost certainly permit the allocation of a
larger share of the loss to the customer than is true under the current regime. Given my
view about who is most likely at fault in such cases. I indorse that outcome. That is a
virtue of the comparative negligence standard.
Yet, I have a fear about the practical effect of the comparative negligence standard.
It is possible that the standard will cause allocation of some losses away from the least
cost-risk avoider and contrary to what I have above predicted. Would courts in cases
such as Rhode Island Trust be more likely to find that a bank (which had failed to examine any signature under a certain dollar amount) was itself partly at fault and so had
"substantially" contributed to the loss and thus should bear some part of it? If that is
true, the power of the loss allocation system to stimulate socially appropriate behavior
will be diminished and the dead weight loss arising from litigation will be further increased by the hope of transferring some of the loss to those who are now regarded as
not at all at fault . In effect, I suggest that the use of a comparative allocation rule may
have the unintended consequence of also changing the standards by which one measures negligence, that it may have the consequence of altering the Learned Hand
calculus and of imposing duties where before none existed. That, of course, is not the
purpose of a comparative standard, but it is plausible to think that it could have that
consequence.
One other fault in the comparative negligence standard lies in its potential for stimulating litigation where none would now exist. If there are now many cases that are settled
without litigation because one party finds itself hopelessly at fault and understands that
it will bear the entire loss, and if those cases would be litigated in a comparative negligence regime out of a hope of recovering at least a part of the loss, the comparative
negligence standard may bring with it a dead weight loss in the form of litigation expense that will outweigh its virtues. Whether that will happen is impossible to predict.
The data on the impact of comparative negligence on the torts system in this respect
are equivocal.
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My final and most serious complaint is one that probably could have been directed
at the drafting committee of each of the articles of the Uniform Commercial Code and
certainly at the drafters of every set of amendments to any of the articles. That is the
complaint that there is no explicit rule that deals with the problems posed by Goldstein's curse when none of the specific rules apply. The drafters should be applauded
for their recognition of specific issues in sections such as the amendments to sections
3-406 and 4-406. Indeed, in sections 4A-202 and 4A-203, the drafters have come
quite close to a general recognition of the problems arising from the curse, at least in
electronic funds transfer cases. Yet, there is no general rule of default in article 4A or
in the amendments to articles 3 and 4. Worse, the proposals for the use of comparative
negligence in sections 4-406 and 3-406 may leave the courts confused about the appropriate analogy. Some courts are likely to conclude that they should copy sections 3-406
and 4-406; other courts may follow the direction of section I-103 into the common law
and so apply traditional rules of negligence and contributory negligence.
Of course, if the specific sections of articles 3, 4 and 4A have dealt with every case
that could arise from Goldstein's curse, my concerns are unfounded . To show that that
is not so, consider three cases that are not covered by article 4A or by the amendments
to articles 3 and 4. First is Goldstein's own case. There Judge Haight refused to allow
Union Trust to recover from the downstream banks under section 4-202 by applying
3-406 by analogy to Union Trust. Neither the current section 3-406 nor the proposed
reaches the Union Trust case. No Union Trust signature was at issue and so the bank
could not be estopped to deny its signature. Nothing in the amendments changes this
outcome and even after the amendments a judge would be called upon to make his
own law.
The second case that will soon come to the court, if it has not already, arises
when the sending or receiving bank "helps along" a fraudulent electronic fund transfer.
Assume, for example,"that a thief successfully breaks a security code and somehow
acquires most, but not all of the proper identification of the depositor's account. The
thief then sends a message instructing a withdrawal (or a deposit if it is done at the receiving end) to an account numbered 55555 . Unbeknownst to the thief, the sending (or
receiving) bank account contains a letter at the end of the numerals, i.e., 55555E. Is the
sending or receiving bank who unintentionally assists the thief in committing a fraud
by adding the "E" to the "55555" itself engaged in negligence? If fraudulent transfers
are more likely than non-fraudulent ones to have small defects and if such defects
would put a reasonably prudent banker on notice, should not the bank be held negligent
and bear the loss? It seems so to me, yet I see nothing in article 4A that would allow
that result.
Consider yet another form of apparent negligence practiced in an actual case that did
not come to court. In that case an American and a group of Colombians - all apparently in the drug trade - stole several millions of dollars by use of the name-number
discrepancy now covered by section 4A-305. They ultimately attempted to withdraw
the money by appearing en masse in a foreign, non-Spanish speaking country, to carry
away their funds in cash in paper bags. According to the testimony given in that case,
the appearance of a wild-eyed group seeking to take more than $10 million in cash in a
paper bag, would put any reasonable bank on notice of something amiss. If the bank
ignored that notice, should it not bear the loss? I believe it should, but there is nothing
in article 4A that would allow it.
If anything is certain, it is that the imaginations of honest lawyers and law professors
are much more impoverished than the imagination of the Goldsteins. Therefore, we can
safely predict that there are frauds now secretly at work and others soon to occur that
are well beyond our imaginations.
How should the courts then deal with my three examples and with the scores of
others that Goldstein's curse will present to the courts over the next twenty years?
Are the courts simply to apply the rules in articles 3, 4 and 4A and to ignore the fact

that those rules require the loss to fall on someone who may not be the least cost-risk
avoider? If not that, then what? Should the courts apply section 3-406 by analogy?
Should they apply the common law via section 1-103?
Here the drafters have failed us. We need a specific section. In my view this section
should direct the court to place the loss on the one most seriously at fault who, by hypothesis, could most cheaply have avoided the loss. I believe that the section should be
supported by commentary that would spell out the three assumptions that I have above
posed.
Absent such a rule, I foresee not only the probability of bad law, but also of nonuniform law. Because my three assumptions are indorsed only by implication and by
inference to be drawn from sections such as 4A-202 and 4A-203, those rules will not
be obvious to judges who are not as thoughtful as Judge Haight. Moreover, some
courts will erroneously conclude that the banking system as a whole should bear the
loss because they believe that system is a better risk spreader and because they believe
it can most easily avoid future losses. Finally, even well-intentioned courts may seize
on different elements of different rules and apply them by analogy. The modest bow to
comparative negligence in sections 3-406 and 4-406 invites this lack of uniformity.
In conclusion, I applaud the incremental recognition of Goldstein's curse by the
drafters of the amendments to articles 3 and 4 and article 4A. I predict that the system's
ability to distinguish between fraudulent and honest transactions will not improve and is
likely to decline. I believe, therefore, that Goldstein's curse will be with us for the foreseeable future and that the civil law problems it will present to the courts will increase. I
hope that I am not a Cassandra and that at least the courts, if not the drafters, will agree
with my three assumptions and so place the losses arising from Goldstein's curse on
those who can most easily avoid them. And I hope that is so, even though those losers
will most often be persons outside of or at the margins of the bank)Jayment system.
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